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The Peace Accords: 
Implications for the Future of Guatemala 
HUGHBYRNE 
On December 29, 1996, the Guatema-lan government and leaders of the Guatemalan National Revolution-
ary Unity (URNG) guerrilla front signed the 
final peace agreement to end the country' s 
36-year war. The war in Guatemala, though 
less visible to the international community 
than those in neighboring El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, was enormously costly in terms 
of lives lost and human suffering. 
The peace accords are an extremely im-
portant moment in Guatemala' s history rep-
resenting a passage from the nightmare of 
the last four decades to at least the hope of 
a better future. The accords are far from 
perfect, particularly in their limitations on 
telling the whole truth about the country's 
bitter recent history and in the inadequacy 
of their provisions to address the deep in-
equalities of Guatemalan society. But they 
represent an important move away from the 
country' s history of exclusion, discrimina-
tion, and impunity. The accords also pro-
vide the political space within which the 
growing network of peasant, indigenous, 
labor, and women's groups, and human 
rights and other organizations can press 
for political and social change. 
From a population of 10 million, more 
than 100,000 people were killed, 40,000 were 
"disappeared," up to a million were forced 
from their homes, and over 400 villages were 
razed to the ground. In the worst period of 
the war in the early 1980s, thousands of 
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men, women, and children 
were murdered by the 
Guatemalan armed forces 
and paramilitary groups 
in wholesale massacres. 
Views of the Accords 
The peace agreement 
to end the war is a result 
of the two main protago-
nists in the conflict realiz-
ing that, despite their dif-
ferences, they shared mu-
tual interests in ending the 
conflict. The URNG front 
realized that there was no 
prospect of defeating the 
government through 
armed force and that its 
best hope for develop-
ment lay in open political 
competition following a 
peace accord. The Guate-
malan government, par-
ticularly the current ad-
ministration of Alvaro 
Arzu , accepted that its 
strategy of economic 
A member of CONAVIGUA, an organization of indigenous 
Guatemalan women widowed due to war and poverty, works 
in a cornfield in northern Guatemala. Photo by Ellen Shub 
growth fueled by foreign investment and 
aid would only be possible if the country 
was at peace. Each party had something to 
bargain with, but there was not equality in 
the negotiating positions- and this is evi-
dent in the final peace agreement. 
The final peace accords, made up of a 
number of substantive and operational 
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agreements, can be looked at in three ways 
at the same time. They are, first, a great 
achievement since they provide a frame-
work or blueprint for peace and social re-
form in Guatemala- these agreements, with 
all their limitations, provide Guatemalans 
with their best opportunity for changing 
continued on page two 
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the unjust and exclusive arrangements un-
der which they have lived for centuries. 
Second, looked at in terms of the specific 
agreements, they are a very mixed bag. The 
accords include very positive agreements 
with great potential (e.g., the Indigenous 
Peoples Accord) alongside some extremely 
limited accords (e.g., the Socioeconomic 
Accord) and others (such as the amnesty 
provisions in the agreement on allowing 
the URNG to return to civilian life) that cast 
a shadow over the entire agreement. But, 
third, perhaps more than anything else, they 
are a work in progress. Many of the ac-
cords are framed in such broad language 
that their impact will only become clear 
through political struggle over their mean-
ing and implementation. 
Ending the War 
The first major achievement of the ac-
cords is to have put an end to the 36-year 
civil war. With even a minimal level of seri-
ousness in the implementation of the agree-
ments, the likelihood of a return to armed 
conflict appears minimal. The Arzu gov-
ernment h taken steps to force out hard-
line and corrupt elements of the military 
who might have opposed these agree-
ments. The URNG guerrilla front has shown 
itself sufficiently in control ofits members 
to ensure a cease-fire since March 1996. 
Any remaining "guerrilla fronts" are 
likely to be more criminal than political in 
nature (or attempts at destabilizing the 
peace process from the right) and can be 
dealt with within the normal legal processes. 
If they do not, then Guatemalans will have 
won the Phyrric victory_ of ending a war 
but still be living in an unfair, exclusive, 
and conflict-ridden society. 
Protection of Human Rights 
The Human Rights Accord of March 
1994 and the actions taken in connection 
with it formed an indispensable spinal col-
umn for the entire peace process. The agree-
five reports to date, as well as reports by 
the UN independent expert on human 
rights, Monica Pinto, show that politically 
motivated violations of human rights con-
tinue at a very serious rate. In its most re-
cent report (July 19, 1996), MINUGUA con-
cluded that there had been "tangible 
progress" in human rights but that "this 
progress was not sufficient to bring about 
substantial change in a situation charac-
terized by grave hu-
man rights violations 
Historically unaccountable 
sectors (normally the military) 
have been unwilling to accept 
peace if they may be held 
liable to prosecution for 
violations of human rights. 
and persistent impu-
nity." 
It is clear then 
that if Guatemala is to 
become a society 
governed by the rule 
of law rather than by 
the reality of impu-
nity and if the human 
rights of the popula-
tion are to be fully re-
ment-the only major accord to go into 
effect on signing-helped create the con-
ditions of greater security, freedom of ex-
pression and to organize that made the 
whole process appear a more viable one. 
The agreement called for recognition of 
basic human rights, measures to strengthen 
the judicial system, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, the deployment of a UN human 
rights mission to verify the accord. 
The arrival of the UN human rights veri-
fication mission (MINUGUA) with both a 
human rights monitoring and institution-
spected, the achieve-
ments made in the 
last two years must be consolidated and 
built upon. This will require a continuation 
of the work of MINUGUA in monitoring 
Ending the war is in itself a major 
achievement that should lead to increased 
security and a lessening of suffering: 
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For information and grant guidelines, 
write to: Resist, One Summer St., 
Somerville, MA 02143 
Resist Newsletter is published ten times a 
year by RESIST, Inc., One Summer Street, 
Somerville,MA02143 (617)623-5110. The 
views expressed in articles, other than edi-
torials, are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the opinions of the 
RESIST staff or board. 
So, ending the war is in itself a major 
achievement that should lead to increased 
security and a lessening of suffering, as 
well as being an essential precondition for 
broader social peace, reconciliation, and 
reconstruction. 
Like any peace agreement, the primary 
purpose is to end a conflict. Nonetheless, 
it is fair to ask whether the provisions pro-
vide at least a framework for addressing 
the main problems that gave rise to the war. 
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strengthening role, played a critical part in 
building confidence that the peace process 
could lead to real and lasting change. Since 
its arrival in November 1994, there has been 
a steep decline in politically motivated kill-
ings and other human rights abuses. Gov-
ernment actions against human rights vio-
lators in the military have contributed to a 
climate of greater respect for human rights. 
But while there has been a marked im-
provement in human rights, MINUGUA's 
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and reporting on the human rights situa-
tion and in strengthening the institutions 
concerned with human rights. It will also 
require vigilant oversight to ensure full 
implementation of the peace agreements 
and international financial and technical 
support to help strengthen or create viable 
institutions to protect the rights of Guate-
malans. 
The Role of the Military 
The· accord signed in September 1996 
on Strengthening of Civil Power and the 
Function of the Army in a Democratic So-
ciety has been viewed positively in Guate-
mala and internationally but, like a number 
of the accords, it is more ofa promise than 
a reality and will require substantial do-
mestic and international commitment to re-
alize its potential. 
The main objectives of the accord, if 
realized, would give the armed forces their 
appropriate role in a democratic society as 
opposed to above it and out of control. 
The military would be subject to civilian 
authority, separated from domestic police 
functions and given the specific role of de-
fending the country's territory and sover-
eignty. The commitments in the accord on 
civil power and the role of the military- to 
cut back on numbers and spending by a 
third, and to redefine the army ' s task-re-
flect this changed role. 
But while the current leaders of the Gua-
temalan armed forces appear willing to ac-
cept a new role in the future, their unwill-
ingness to accept a thorough examination 
of past violations of human rights reflects 
the institution's lack of full accountability 
to Guatemalan society. Although the agree-
ment has some positive elements (the Arzu 
government has taken steps to isolate hard-
line officers), as in many other Latin Ameri-
can nations making the transition from dic-
tatorship to some form of democratic gov-
ernment, the military is not fully back in the 
barracks and could still intervene if it feels 
its interests threatened. 
While there is room for some optimism 
regarding the future role of the military in 
Guatemalan society, the issue of strength-
ening civilian institutions-particularly the 
judicial system- is a more problematical 
one. This is not so much a problem with 
the accords themselves nor a question of 
political will , but an issue of the size and 
scope of the problem to be resolved. In 
Guatemala, the police and judicial systems 
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have barely functioned or have functioned 
to perpetuate anti-democratic behavior and 
norms. The building of new institutions 
with a changed philosophy, code, and prac-
tices becomes a long-term project requir-
ing continuing domestic commitment and 
will and significant aid and support from 
the international community. The accord 
Peoples, signed in March 1995 is one of 
the most far-reaching of all the accords in 
attempting to address this most profound 
question for the Guatemalan nation. 
The accord incorporates many of the 
positions of organizations representing the 
indigenous peoples of Guatemala and has 
been generally accepted by these groups 
as a positive framework 
within which to articulate 
and advance their inter-
ests. The accord reflects 
the intention to change 
completely the condition 
and position of indig-
enous people within Gua-
temala society-by end-
ing discrimination; ac-
knowledging that indig-
enous communities are 
authors of their own cul-
tural development; recog-
nizing the country as 
multiethnic, multilingual, 
and with a plurality of cul-
tures; and increasing the 
participation and repre-
sentation of i~digenous 
peoples at all levels ofna-
tional life. 
Graffiti on a wall near Guatemala's National Palace calls 
The Accord on the 
Identity and Rights of the 
Indigenous Peoples will 
require a transformation in 
attitudes that have en-
dured for centuries. This 
process will undoubtedly 
for "No More War" in 1992. Photo by Carol Schachet 
on civil power and the role of the military is 
a step in dealing with the problem- by cre-
ating a new National Civil Police, increas-
ing spending on the judicial system and 
access to it, and creating a commission to 
help remake the justice system. Butthe full 
achievement of these changes will be one 
of the major challenges for Guatemala in 
the coming years. 
Dealing with Exclusion and 
Discrimination 
A major cause of the civil conflict and a 
stain on Guatemalan society has been the 
discrimination , social and economic 
marginalization, and political exclusion vis-
ited upon the majority of Guatemalans-
the poor, women, and particularly indig-
enous people who make up about half of 
the country's population. The Accord on 
the Identity and Rights of the Indigenous 
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take time. The accord, however, provides 
the framework within which to begin the 
transformation. But for the changes envis-
aged in the accord to have more than sym-
bolic meaning, it is essential that the so-
cioeconomic conditions of Guatemala's in-
digenous peoples- 85% of whom live in 
poverty-are fully addressed. Unfortu-
nately, this is the area where the Guatema-
lan peace accords are least developed. 
Socioeconomic Changes in the Peace 
Accords 
The Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects 
and the Agrarian Situation signed in May 
1996 is one of the accords that has been 
most criticized by civil society sectors in 
Guatemala. Limited in its scope, it speaks 
largely in the language of goals and aspi-
rations, and fails to grasp the nettle of ex-
continued on page four 
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tensive poverty and inequalities that helped 
give rise to the armed conflict. The accord 
reflects the inequalities of power in Guate-
malan society-particularly, the strength 
of the business sector vis-a-vis groups rep-
resenting historically disenfranchised sec-
tors. Thus, the framework for resolving the 
country's dire socioeconomic situation is 
fundamentally a market-driven approach-
via high rates of growth promoted through 
sound macroeconomic policies. Questions 
of equity and access to the market have 
taken a secondary role, and agrarian re-
form has gone unmentioned. 
The Socioeconomic Accord articulates 
important aspirations, namely increased 
citizen participation and a greater role for 
women in socioeconomic development. It 
also commits the government to significant 
increases in spending on health and edu-
cation. The goal of increasing by fifty per-
cent the taxes collected promises a greater 
sharing of the burden of development in 
Guatemalan society, while provisions re-
garding land in the Socioeconomic Accord 
and in the accords on Indigenous Rights 
and on the Resettlement of Populations 
Uprooted by the Armed Confrontation 
(June 1994) promise to improve the eco-
nomic situation of some of the communi-
ties most affected by the war. 
Finally, while it is fair to say that the 
Socioeconomic Accord is weak in dealing 
with the profound problems of Guatema-
lan society, it should also be noted that in 
El Salvador's 1992 peace accords the so-
cioeconomic area was probably the weak-
est in the entire agreement, despite the fact 
that the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas were 
in a much stronger relative position than 
Accessibility Grants 
Resist actively seeks to fund the 
additional costs of projects or events 
which will make them accessible to 
people with disabilities, such as sign 
language interpreters or wheelchair 
accessible venues. The events them-
selves must fit within Resist's fund-
ing priorities. 
For more information and to receive 
our grant guidelines, contact Resist, 
One Summer Street, Somerville, MA 
02143; 617/623-5110. 
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their counterparts in Guatemala. 
Revealing the Truth about the Past 
The area of the Guatemalan peace ac-
cords that has already caused the greatest 
difficulty and concern is the extent to which 
the truth will be revealed about major hu-
man rights violations committed during the 
Guatemalan negotiators failed the test. The 
accord that establishes the Clarification 
Commission provides that the Commission 
will "not individualize responsibilities" for 
violations, thereby precluding, from the 
start, the whole truth being told about even 
the most heinous crimes committed during 
the armed conflict. The accord reflected the 
A returned Guatemalan refugee stands near one of several bombs found near the newly-
settled community of La Quetzal. The bombs were believed to have been dropped by the 
Guatemalan army during a 1991 clash with the URNG. Photo by Piet van Lier, Impact Visuals 
war. It is an issue that may become even 
more contentious and affect the possibil-
ity of genuine reconciliation in Guatemala. 
During the negotiations, the two par-
ties had to face the extremely difficult moral 
and political question that has been dealt 
with in a number of other countries in re-
cent years-Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, 
South Africa, among others-following in-
ternal civil conflicts. On one hand, recon-
ciliation and healing depend on the truth 
being told to victims of major human rights 
abuse and their families, and on some level 
of justice being done. But powerful and 
historically unaccountable sectors (nor-
mally the military) have been unwilling to 
accept a transition to peace and democ-
racy if they may be held liable to prosecu-
tion for violations of human rights carried 
out during the conflict. What compromises, 
if any, are justified to secure the end of the 
conflict and the potential transition to a 
more open and democratic society? 
In the view of Guatemala's civil society 
sectors, particularly those representing hu-
man rights victims and their families, the 
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position of the Guatemalan armed forces 
which had specified that the Commission 
should "not individualize those responsible 
nor include sanctions of any nature." 
The limitations on the role of the Clari-
fication Commission are compounded in 
the view of Guatemalan civil society 
groups and international human rights or-
ganizations by the proposed amnesty 
agreement contained in the Agreement for 
the Basis for the Reincorporation of the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary 
Unity into Legality signed in Madrid on 
December 12, 1996. Provisions in the agree-
ment guarantee immunity from prosecution 
for members of the armed forces and those 
acting under their command for unspeci-
fied common crimes carried out with "the 
aim of impeding, frustrating, repressing or 
sanctioning the commission of political and 
related common crimes carried out by 
armed opposition groups." 
At the time of writing, the Arzu govern-
ment had submitted a proposed amnesty 
law to the Guatemalan congress that is at 
best ambiguous. It purports to give am-
January I 997 
nesty to members of both contending 
forces for political acts carried out in pur-
suit of the armed conflict while at the same 
time saying that certain acts are 
"imprescriptible" (inviolable, incapable of 
being revoked), suggesting that acts such 
as massacres, extra-judicial executions, and 
torture would not be covered by the am-
nesty provisions. The problem is that the 
ambiguity in the agreement and in the sub-
sequent legislation will produce on-going, 
case-by-case struggles over particular in-
dividuals and specific acts with the likeli-
hood that few of those responsible for 
grave violations will ultimately be brought 
to justice. The question that is left for vic-
tims of human rights violations and their 
supporters: Is peace and reconciliation 
possible if there is not a satisfactory ac-
counting of the past? 
Monitoring _the Peace Process 
The playing-field in Guatemala, however, 
is not even, despite the positiv~ changes 
in the accords. This makes it essential that 
the international community- govern-
ments, financial institutions, and NGOs-
make a commitment to support Guatemala's 
peace process for the long haul. There are 
a number of ways in which international 
support will be crucial to the people of 
Guatemala at this moment of transition: 
*Monitoring the peace accords: The 
United Nations, probably with MINUGUA 
playing a central role, will be charged with 
verifying compliance with the peace agree-
ment. It is important they play a public and 
vigilant role to ensure maximum compliance 
with the agreements and that international 
funding be conditioned upon effective 
implementation of the accords. 
*Ensuring community involvement in 
peace and development: The Guatemalan 
government is seeking over $1.5 billion to 
support implementation of the accords. 
Much of this funding will come from gov-
ernments (mainly European) as well as the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and the World Bank. It is essential that the 
projects carried out in Guatemala to sup-
port peace and reconstruction have the 
fullest possible involvement oflocal com-
munities and base organizations in all 
stages of development of the projects 
which affect them. There are signs that the 
international financial institutions, particu-
larly the IDB, are willing in Guatemala to 
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Thousands of refugees have returned to 
Guatemala from camps in Mexico. Photo by 
Sean Sprague, Impact Visuals 
support innovative projects that fully in-
volve local people in the development pro-
cess. One such program, "Community De-
velopment for Peace," a $55 million pro-
gram in war-torn areas of Huehuetenango 
may be a model for such efforts. 
*U.S. support for the peace process: 
The U.S. role in Guatemala since the CIA-
led overthrow of the Arbenz government 
in 1954 is one of the worst chapters in Cold 
War history. In recent years, the U.S. has 
played a more productive role in pushing 
the two negotiating parties toward resolu-
tion of the conflict. In the coming period, 
the U.S. can support the consolidation of 
peace in Guatemala by pressing the parties 
(particularly the government, to which most 
of the obligations accrue) to fully carry out 
the agreement. Also, increasing U.S. aid to 
Guatemala-currently under $40 million 
compared to about $280 million to El Salva-
dor over three years following that country's 
1992 peace agreement-can help create the 
conditions for peace and reconciliation. 
*Support by U.S. citizens and groups: 
A wide variety of U.S. groups-human 
rights, religious, solidarity, labor, and oth-
ers-have played an indispensable role in 
accompanying Guatemalans working for 
justice, peace, and social reforms over many 
years. Those in Guatemala working to 
implement the accords and fulfill their prom-
ise will need even greater support in the 
coming years as the possible openings for 
change multiply but within a situation that 
continues to be extremely difficult. 
Hugh Byrne is a Fellow at the Washing-
ton Office on Latin America in Washing-
ton, DC, and author ofEl Salvador's Civil 
War: A Study in Revolution (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, I 996). 
Confused by Postal Reclassification Regulations? 
Help is Here! 
If your are part of a grassroots group trying to comply with the new U.S. Postal 
Service requirements, RESIST might be able to help. As of July 1, 1996, standard 
(formerly "bulk") mail must be pre-sorted by ADCs (Area Distribution Centers) to 
receive discounts. If you don't know what this means, it probably doesn't apply to 
you. However, if you do know, we may be able to help you convert your zip code list 
to ADC order if your oganization fits the following criteria: 
• Non-profit social change group 
• Use a dBase-style database 
· • Mail to at least 200 addresses 
• Use an IBM-compatible computer 
(DOS or Windows) 
A Resist donor has generously designed a program that creates and fills an 
ADC field within your database, allowing you to order your list by ADCs. To 
receive a copy of this program, please indicate if you need a 5¼ or 3 ½ disk and 
send $2 to cover mailing costs to: 
Resist• One Summer Street• Somerville, MA 02143. 
RESIST offers no technical support with this program. However, written and 
on-screen instructions are included with the program. 
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RESIST awards grants eight times a 
year to groups throughout the United 
States engaged in social justice activ-
ism. This issue of the Newsletter lists 
grant recipients from the December 
1996 Board meeting and highlights a 
f ew of those groups. For more informa-
tion about these grants, contact the 
organizaitons themselves at the ad-
dresses listed below. 
December 1996 Grantees include: 
Brandywine Peace Community (Swarth-
more, PA) 
Citizens Awareness Network (Shelburne 
Falls, MA) 
Ecumenical Program on Central America 
& the Caribbean (Washington, DC) 
Friends ofNitassinan (Burlington, VT) 
Houston Committee for Youth and 
Nonmilitary Opportunities (Bellaire, TX) 
New York CISPES (New York, NY) 
PFLAG-Toledo (Toledo, OH) 
Pikes Peak Justice and Peace Commission 
(Colorado Springs, CO) 
Political Ecology Group (San Francisco, 
CA) 
Thread City Currency Committee 
(Williamantic, CT) 
Wisconsin Coordinating Council on 
Nicaragua (Madison, WI) 
GRANTS 
Eastern North American 
Native Forest Network 
19 Church Street, Suite 7 
Burlington, VT 05402 
The Native Forest Network (NFN) was 
founded in 1991 by activists seeking to 
create a globally organized forest move-
ment with a focus on neglected temperate 
forests. NFN includes a worldwide collec-
tive of forest activists, indigenous peoples, 
conservation biologists, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations. The Eastern 
North American Native Forest Network 
(NFNENA)formed in 1993. 
The Native Forest Network is working 
to permanently ban the aerial herbicide 
spraying of the forests of Vermont and to 
bring perpetually sustainable forestry to 
the region. A RESIST grant of$ I ,OOO will 
_help kick off that campaign. 
U.S./Guatemala Labor 
Education Project 
PO Box 268-290 
Chicago, IL 60626 
U.S./GLEPwas founded in 1987 by U.S. 
trade unionists seeking to focus atten-
tion on violations of the basic rights of 
Guatemalan workers. Two ofU. S./G LEP' s 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• 
Join the RESIST Pledge Program 
We'd like you to consider 
becoming a RESIST Pledge. 
Pledges account for over 
25% of our income. 
By becoming a pledge. you help 
guarantee RESIST a fixed and 
dependable source of income on which 
we can build our grant-making 
program. In return, we will send you a 
monthly pledge letter and reminder 
along with your newsletter. We will 
keep you up-to-date on the groups we 
have funded and the other work being 
done at RESIST. 
So take the plunge and become a 
RESIST Pledge! We count on you, and 
the groups we fund count on us. 
Yes/ I'll become a 
RESIST Pledge. 
I'll send you my pledge of $ __ 
every month/two months/ 
quarter/six months (circle one). 
[ ] Enclosed is an initial pledge 
contribution of$ ___ . 
[ ] I can't join the pledge program 
now, but here's a contribution of 
$ ___ to support your work. 
Name ________ _ 
Address _______ _ 
City/State/Zip _____ _ 
Phone ________ _ 
RESIST • One Summer Street• Somerville, MA 02143 • 617/623-Sll0 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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campaigns include the Coffee Workers 
Project- which led to Starbuck' s imple-
menting a " code of conduct" for planta-
tions from which they purchase coffee-
and the Maquila Project. 
Part of the Maquila Project links North 
American and Guatemalan women 
workers and rights advocates in the 
struggle for labor rights. A RESIST grant 
of$1 ,000 supports this project. 
DC Student Coalition 
Against Racism 
PO Box 18291 
Washington, DC 20036 
Formed in 1983, the mission ofDC SCAR 
has been to involve young people in 
combatting racism and bigotry, including 
opposing Apartheid in South Africa. In 
the 1990s projects have grown to include 
unlearning racism and bigotry training, 
conflict resolution programs with "at 
risk" youth and examining racism in the 
prison industry. 
DC SCAR also sponsors an organizing 
internship program which trains college 
and high school students to confront 
racism on both local and international 
levels. A RESIST grant of $1 ,000 will 
support this internship program. 
North Carolina 
Farmworkers' Project 
PO Box 352 
Benson, NC 27504 
The North Carolina Farmworkers' Project 
was formed in 1994 by farmworker advo-
cates who sought to create an organiza-
tion controlled by migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers. Since that time, NCFP has 
educated farmworkers about the rights 
and privileges available to them under 
law; assisted workers in redressing their 
grievances; provided leadership training; 
conducted workshops on occupational 
safety; planned cultural and educational 
events; and advocated for the fair treat-
ment of workers. 
A RESIST grant of $1 ,000 will help 
purchase a new copier to assist with 
outreach and organizing . 
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